If you are concerned about falling for one of the most common Facebook mistakes, why not take a look at our guide here.
In this show, Jono and Ross discuss Holiday foods, Christmas in Jerusalem and Nazareth (or maybe not), Arabian women behind the wheel, and even UFOs.
I downloaded the application and it did not work, but I kept it on my phone and we went back to chatting on Facebook Messenger.
It took me a while to discover that I had fallen into the trap and that I was chatting with a Hamas member.” Suddenly realizing the severity of the situation, the Israeli army issued a warning for soldiers to be extra vigilant when using their smartphones and tablets.
No one knows how important and dangerous the information Hamas operatives were able to gather from soldiers [was], although Israeli intelligence has very advanced technologies it could use to do the same to the Palestinian resistance.” One IDF soldier, who decided to remain anonymous for obvious reasons, was interviewed on the Israeli Channel 2 to explain how Hamas operatives were slyly using fabricated Facebook profiles to engage soldiers in conversation and deceive them into becoming infected with the Trojan Horse: “A beautiful girl contacted me [on Facebook] and we started talking.
After we got to know each other and I started trusting her, she asked me to download a special application for private messaging.
Some Hamas supporters, however, feel that the whole story is unlikely because the attack vector would work contrary to the religious views of the Gaza-based militia.
Perhaps it is this contradictory moral stance, however, that has kept Hamas from stepping forward to take credit for the attack.
Security is a subject that can be taught theoretically, but nothing is a substitute for a real hands-on experience and we’ve got lots of it.” Perhaps it is because of this high level of know-how, that the IDF decided to be so public about the attack vector, in order to stop any embarrassing leaks before they occurred. According to Avichay Adraee, a spokesperson for the army, it is believed that in total 16 fake profiles were used as honeypots to hook the Israeli soldiers.
Alaa al-Rimawi, director of Al-Quds Center for Studies of Israeli and Palestinian Affairs, said that there is concern that the Hamas operatives may have been trying to establish links within the IDF to find corrupt soldiers willing to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip. In reality, however, these kinds of socially engineered attacks – although effective – are an untechnical method that could have easily been perpetrated by any ‘script kiddie.’ In addition, there has been a huge rise (over the last few years) in the number of Trojans available to hackers online.
It is also worth remembering that many of those cybersecurity experts learned their trade working for Israeli military intelligence.